

26 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with Dr. Roger Engel,
Director, Tactical Intelligence Systems, DASD/1, 26 March 1986

1. [redacted] and I met with Engel in his office at the Pentagon. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] detailed to Engel's office from PBS/ICS, sat in. [redacted] described Engel 25X1
as the functional program manager for TIARA (Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities).

2. I outlined the genesis of the force multiplier study. Engel's first
reaction was that whether or not "military operators" see intelligence as a
force multiplier depends upon their own experience with intelligence. If they
have no or little experience, intelligence performance is not likely to meet
their inflated expectations.

3. Engel said that our intelligence support "systems" are reasonably good
in peacetime. In terms of Sigint, NSA has a massive capability, but it has
not been fully institutionalized even though it now has an office that
"interfaces directly into the JCS" for operations planning and support. In
imagery, [redacted] transmission systems get imagery 25X1
directly to the operators (JSOC has a terminal so does the CIA for its
operations). Despite these kinds of capabilities, in wartime the intelligence
system is extremely fragile because of one-of-a-kind applications, soft
facilities, and generally inadequate resources. The system would come to a
"screeching halt" in a day or two after the outbreak of hostilities.

[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] (Following a Reforger exercise six years ago, an Army
audit concluded that the only worthwhile intelligence support came from
corps-controlled, long-range reconnaissance patrols.) 25X1

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] 25X1

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6. Engel said that in the preparation of the study, talking with people in the field is a must. The "real" force multiplier challenge is ultimately to develop intelligence products that are tailored to the field commander's needs. So far we've succeeded in doing this only in "intelligence-and-warning situations" and in limited contingency operations when everything is under our control.

7. I aksed Engel about his reactions to the item in today's Post about the NFIP budget (attached). Engel said that the SSCI is wrong in its perception that there is a lot of NFIP-TIARA overlap. Engel explained that TIARA is merely related to intelligence....it is not intelligence. TIARA is integrated into the "fighting world," into the force structure. For example, it encompasses SOSUS, BMEWS, and tactical air reconnaissance (RF-4Cs) including the SR-71s. If the latter were to be shifted to the NFIP, funding would be eliminated using an argument that satellites do the job just as well. (In fact, the SR-71s provide "sub-noptic" coverage--they can cover vaster expanses more quickly than satellites.)

8. Engel said he couldn't address HUMINT ("I'm not in the HUMINT business") although he thought there were some joint DoD-CIA programs designed to support "maneuver groups" that grew out of a Bernie Rogers-Bill Casey conversation some years ago. He noted that special operations were neither TIARA nor NFIP funded.

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DCI/ICS/CIPC, [REDACTED] (27 Mar 86)

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